We examine conditions under which an exclusive license granted by the upstream producer of a component that some consumers regard as essential to one of two potential suppliers of a downstream platform market can make the unlicensed supplier unpro…table, although both …rms would be pro…table if both were licensed. If downstream varieties are close substitutes, an exclusive license need not be exclusionary. If downstream varieties are highly di¤erentiated, an exclusive license is exclusionary, but it is not in the interest of the upstream …rm to grant an exclusive license. For intermediate levels of product differentiation, an exclusive license is exclusionary and maximizes the upstream …rm's payo¤.
Introduction
We model a platform market that is supplied by an upstream …rm with a complementary good that some consumers on one side of the market regard as essential. The model is a stylized version of a newspaper market, potentially a duopoly. Downstream …rms are di¤erentiated platforms, newspapers, that supply the two sides, advertisers and readers, of the platform market. The upstream …rm, a syndicate, is the monopoly supplier of publishable material -newspaper columns and comic strips. We show that the impact of an exclusive license granted by the upstream …rm to one of the downstream …rms depends on the extent of di¤erentiation between the products of the downstream …rms and on the relative size of the market segment that regards the complementary good as essential. If consumers regard downstream varieties as close substitutes, duopoly with only one …rm licensed to publish the complementary material can be an equilibrium outcome. For intermediate degrees of product di¤erentiation and a su¢ ciently large fraction of the population that regards the complementary good as essential, an exclusive license can deprive the unlicensed …rm of enough advertising revenue to make it unpro…table. For high levels of product di¤erentiation, an exclusive license would make an unlicensed newspaper unpro…table, but the payo¤-maximizing choice for the upstream …rm is to license both …rms.
In a platform market, two groups of users interact through a platform …rm. The bene…t to users on one side of the market increases with the number of users on the other side of the market, and a platform is able to charge individual prices to the two groups (Rochet and Tirole, 2006) . The newspaper industry is a prototypical example of a platform market. It involves three sets of players: newspapers, readers, and advertisers. In this perspective, readers and advertisers are the two user groups that interact on newspaper platforms.
A newspaper commonly publishes features (articles, comics, puzzles, etc.), along with local, national, and international news and advertisements. Newspaper employees prepare some published material; the remainder is purchased from press syndicates. Press syndicates are upstream …rms that sell specialized material to newspapers. Some such syndicates specialize in the distribution of comic strips, acting as agents for cartoonists, often under exclusive contracts.
An episode from the Dallas, Texas newspaper market exempli…es the phe-nomenon we model. 1 On August 2, 1989, the Dallas Morning News ('Morning News') signed an exclusive contract for 26 columns and comic strips provided by the Universal Press Syndicate. Until the signing of the exclusive contract, the material had been available through the Dallas Times Herald ('Times Herald'). The two newspapers had competed in the Dallas area for more than a century. The Universal Syndicate acknowledged that the move was 'predatory', but said that denial of the material was required by its contract with the Morning News. The Times Herald su¤ered a circulation loss of 9,000 to 10,000 weekday and 15,000 Sunday deliveries. It …led an antitrust lawsuit asking for $33 million in actual damages and up to three times that amount in punitive damages against the Morning News and its parent company. A state judge in Texas refused to grant the Times Herald a preliminary injunction to prevent the movement of the syndicated features, on the ground that the Times Herald could publish substitute features supplied by competing syndicates. The Times Herald subsequently lost a District Court jury trial and an appeal of the District Court outcome. The Morning News nonetheless paid $1.5 million to the Times Herald as part of an outside settlement. The Times Herald was unable to recapture its lost reader base and advertising revenue. The Morning News'parent corporation purchased the Times Herald on December 8, 1991 and stopped its publication the next day. 2 Although we focus speci…cally on the newspaper market in the current study, other platform markets can also portray similar situations of exclusivity. An example of such from the U.S. television industry involves Project Runway, a reality show based on fashion design that was shown by the Bravo Network from 2004 to 2008. On July 2006 the show's producers made an exclusive deal to move the show to Lifetime Television starting from 2009. Litigation followed, and was privately settled after Bravo Network prevailed P69, 680 (1991) . Also see Gelsanliter (1995) . 2 The rise of the internet has made print media a declining industry. (The general increase in concentration in the newspaper markets of US cities, and the corresponding reasons and consequences are discussed in Bucklin et al. (1989) and Genesove (2003) .) Our stylized model is not meant to imply that the Morning News'exclusive arrangement with the United Press Syndicate was the unique factor responsible for the demise of the Times Herald. But the fact that the Times Herald's otherwise unsuccessful legal action resulted in a $1.5 million private settlement is consistent with the view that the exclusive arrangement was a contributing factor in the demise. in early stages. In 2009, Bravo Network launched a competing program ("The Fashion Show"), which enjoyed about one-quarter Project Runway's number of viewers, and correspondingly less advertising revenue. The Fashion Show broadcast its last episode on 25 January 2011. 3 The results of the current study contribute to two literatures. First, it broadens our understanding of the nature of strategic interactions in imperfectly competitive platform markets. Second, it contributes to the literature on exclusion by considering the e¤ect of an exclusive license for a complementary good in a platform market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the parts of the literature on exclusionary contracts involving complementary goods that are most closely related to the present study. Section 3 contains the setup of the model. In Section 4, we present results for the monopoly case. Section 5 contains the basic duopoly model. Section 6 discusses equilibrium licensing behavior for moderately di¤erentiated newspapers. Section 7 contrasts the outcome for an intermediate degree of product di¤erentiation with outcomes if product di¤erentiation is either low or high. Section 8 concludes. 4 2 Literature Review 5
The issue of exclusion and complementary components is discussed in the empirical literature. Dewenter (2003) shows that newspapers, among other media, can form consumer habits that translate into demand for a commodity that becomes an essential component of the media product. Argentesi (2004) shows empirically that weekly supplements (comics, puzzles, etc.) increase 3 See Hu¤, Richard "'Project Runway'quits Bravo for Lifetime," NYDailyNews.com 7 April 2008; Lafayette, Jon "NBCU wins round in 'Project Runway'," TVWeek.com, 26 September 2008; Associated Press, "'Project Runway'is cleared for move to Lifetime from Bravo," 1 April 2009. For a further example of an exclusionary strategy based on loss of advertising revenue in a platform market, see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) . Similarly, T-Mobile's failure to obtain the right to sell Apple iPhones was mentioned as a factor in its proposed March 2011 takeover by AT&T. Other examples are provided by "killer apps" available only on a single platform; see Viecens (2009). 4 Full details of proofs are contained in an appendix that is available on request from the authors. 5 See Rysman (2009) and Whinston (2006, Chapter 4) for surveys of platform markets and exclusionary vertical contracts, respectively. readership of (and as a result advertisement in) newspapers. If a newspaper is denied the possibility of supplying habit-forming content, the newspaper will see its reader base, and with it advertising revenue, decline. This loss of revenue from one side of the market because of reduced patronage on the other side is central to the exclusionary impact of an exclusive license in a platform market. 6 In the theoretical literature, the issue of exclusion manifests itself in different ways when modeling di¤erent industries. Church and Gandal (2005) argue that directly denying or restricting compatibility among complementary products is exclusionary in the telecommunications industry. 7 Hagiu and Lee (2011) discuss the incentives of content providers to enter into exclusive as opposed to non-exclusive contracts with platforms (such as TV channels). 8 Their model has much in common with ours: downstream …rms are platforms; end users (readers, in our model) single home. But there is no essential complementary good in Hagiu and Lee (2011) , and the nature of their results hinges on whether or not the content provider controls its own pricing to end users. Direct control of pricing does not arise in newspaper markets, which we use as our prototype. In our model, it is the degree of product di¤erentiation in the downstream market that determines if the upstream …rm o¤ers an exclusive license for its content. Hogendorn and Yuen (2009) develop a model that can be thought of as a stylized version of a video game console duopoly. User utility from a platform rises with the number of components on the platform. Components developed for one platform can be ported to the other, at a cost. A content provider o¤ers a "must-have" component that provides additional utility. Each console has an installed base of locked-in users. Whereas Hogendorn and Yuen limit attention to parameter values for which exclusion of one platform ("tipping") does not occur, we explore conditions under which an exclusive license for an essential complementary good results in exclusion. The components of the Hogendorn and Yuen model correspond to advertisements in the Armstrong (2006) model that we extend. There is no equivalent of porting in this framework since readers are not locked-in in 6 We incorporate this e¤ect in our model by assuming that a fraction of the reader side of the market will read a newspaper, if at all, only if it includes an essential complementary good, as further discussed in Section 3.2. 7 See also the remarks of Rey and Tirole (2007, p. 2205) . 8 See also Stennek (2014) , Weeds (2015) .
the Hotelling framework. 9 Doganoglu and Wright (2010) model agreements by agents on one side of a platform to supply only one platform …rm. Their basic model is of a one-sided market. Our model examines conditions under which an upstream …rm will o¤er an exclusive license to one platform …rm. The Doganoglu and Wright model does not involve essential components, either in the sense of Hogendorn and Yuen (2009) or in the sense of the model developed here.
Setup
We modify the Armstrong (2006) "competitive bottlenecks" model (Armstrong, 2006, p. 679) : "Here, if it wishes to interact with an agent on the single-homing side, the multi-homing side has no choice but to deal with that agent's chosen platform. Thus, platforms have monopoly power over providing access to their single-homing customers for the multi-homing side."The two sides of the platform market are comprised of readers and advertisers, respectively.
We assume that readers single-home, reading at most one newspaper. 10 Di¤erences in reader taste and preference are captured by one of the standard models of horizontal product di¤erentiation, the Hotelling main street model. If both …rms enter, there are two newspapers, 'A'located at the left end and 'B' located at the right end of a Hotelling line of length 1. Newspapers sell advertising space to advertisers and print copies of newspapers for sale to readers. There is a syndicate that sells copyrighted materials, such as cartoons and comics, to the newspapers. We normalize the mass of potential 9 Lee (2013) analyzes the impact of vertical integration and exclusivity on the sixth generation of the U.S. video game industry. He …nds that exclusive contracts facilitated entry, but notes that this is not a necessary outcome (p. 2962): "although certain exclusive titles on the incumbent platform sold more copies than any title on the entrant platforms, estimates indicate that these titles did not in ‡uence hardware demand as much as those onboard the entrants. If it were the case that the most valuable software products were exclusive to the incumbent in the data, then the predictions of the counterfactual would have been reversed." Shapiro (1999, p. 676) ascribes exclusionary e¤ects to exclusive contracts entered into by the Nintendo Entertainment System. 10 Rysman (2007) documents that credit-card users concentrate purchases on one credit card, in e¤ect single-homing, while holding infrequently-used credit cards in reserve. In the same way, one may take the assumption of single-homing newspaper readers as approximating the conduct of users who read primarily one newspaper, while occasionally looking at other newspapers. readers and the mass of potential advertisers to be 1. Readers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line and incur "transportation cost" t per unit distance to the chosen end of the line in reading a newspaper. 11 n i R denotes the number of readers of newspaper i, and n i a denotes the number of …rms that advertise in newspaper i. 12 We model the incentive of the syndicate to o¤er an exclusive license and the incentive of a newspaper to accept a license, exclusive or not, if o¤ered. We investigate Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The three stages of the game are shown in Figure 1 . We treat the syndicate's costs as being entirely sunk before it interacts with newspapers. 13 In stage I, the syndicate makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a license to publish the complementary material to either one (without loss of generality, to …rm A) or both newspapers. 14 In stage II, if a newspaper is o¤ered a license, it decides among three options: (i) accept the license and enter the market, (ii) reject the license and enter the market, or (iii) stay out of the market. If a newspaper is not o¤ered a license, it decides either to enter the market or 11 In the context of newspaper markets, preferences might relate to the ideological position of a newspaper's editorial page. Alternatively, preferences might represent the time of day at which a reader would prefer to receive a newspaper; in practice, the alternatives are morning and evening. 12 In what follows, unless otherwise noted, references to "newspaper i"should be understood to carry the quali…cation "for i = A, B." 13 It would be possible to model the syndicate's arrangements with the authors of the material it markets; this would take us far a…eld from our topic.
14 In principle, one might include a third option, not to o¤er a license to either newspaper. The syndicate's payo¤ for this option is zero economic pro…t, it would not be a pro…tmaximizing choice, and we eliminate it for simplicity. to stay out. 15 Newspapers that enter set advertising rates and newspaper prices. In the …nal stage, advertisers place advertisements and readers select newspapers.
The terms on which the syndicate o¤ers a license determine the division of economic pro…t between the syndicate and a platform that accepts the o¤er of a license. Market outcomes under alternative licensing arrangements determine the magnitude of the rents that are divided between syndicate and platforms.
Advertisers
Let i denote newspaper i's per-reader advertising rate. 16 The cost of placing an advertisement in newspaper i is
Advertisers di¤er in their pro…t per sale, . Following Armstrong (2006), we assume that newspapers do not observe the of any particular advertiser, but know the distribution of in the population of advertisers. We assume is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. Given this distribution, it will be pro…table for an advertiser to place an advertisement in newspaper i if the pro…t from placing the advertisement is greater than or equal to the cost of placing the advertisement, n i R i n i R . The expected number of advertisements demanded from newspaper i is therefore
Readers

No Essential Component
If there is no essential complementary good, the net utility of a reader of newspaper i, before allowing for transportation cost t is
15 "Staying out of the market" means the newspaper can earn a normal rate of return on investment elsewhere. 16 See Rosse (1970) for an estimation of advertising cost in newspaper and Armstrong (2006) for discussion of the case in which the price of placing an advertisement is not proportional to the number of readers.
where is marginal utility per advertisement. 17 As noted above, we assume readers single-home. For a reader located at x on the Hotelling line, net utilities are
If the market is covered, 18 boundary readers are at a location that yields the same net utility from either newspaper, leading to boundary location
:
(2)
The number of readers of each newspaper are
(3)
Essential Complementary Good
If some portion of the population regards comics as an essential complementary good, we assume that the speci…cation of readers' demand in equations (3) and (4) describes the preferences of the fraction 1 of the population, for 0 1, that does not regard comics as essential. Then quantities demanded of each newspaper from this part of the population are 1 times the numbers of readers given by (3) and (4), from platforms A and B respectively.
We assume that the remaining portion of the population will read only a newspaper that publishes comics. Otherwise, the utility of this group of consumers is as above. That is, for a consumer who regards comics as an essential component of a newspaper, comics yield no utility in and of themselves, but are a prerequisite for getting utility from a newspaper. This speci…cation minimizes the exclusionary e¤ect of an exclusive license to print comics. 19 A consumer who regards comics as an essential component of a newspaper purchases a newspaper only if it contains comics and if the net utility from reading the newspaper, allowing for transportation cost, is nonnegative.
Suppose newspaper A has an exclusive license to publish comics. The most-distant reader from the "comics" group who reads newspaper A is at the right end of the line if (recall the length of the line is 1)
On the other hand, if p A > n A a t;
the most distant reader from the "comics"group who reads newspaper A is at the distance that makes net utility zero, x = n A a p A =t. Quantities demanded of the two newspapers are
The number of readers for a newspaper with an exclusive license di¤ers depending on whether price is low (all consumers who regard comics as essential read the licensed newspaper) or high (consumers who regard comics as essential and who are distant from the licensed newspaper do not read any newspaper).
Platforms
The cost of producing one issue of a newspaper that contains n a advertisements is f + cn a :
f is the part of the cost of printing a newspaper that is …xed with respect to the number of advertisements. c is the constant marginal cost per advertisement per issue. cn a is marginal cost. The newspaper's overall …xed cost is F . 20 Let
denote newspaper i's pro…t per reader -revenue p i on the sale of the newspaper to the reader, i c gross pro…t per reader per advertisement placed, n i a = 1 i advertisements placed, minus f . Newspaper i's pro…t maximization problem is
A Monopoly Platform
We examine monopoly equilibrium both to build intuition and because if an exclusive license makes it unpro…table for one newspaper to operate, it is monopoly pro…t that is divided between the licensed newspaper and the syndicate.
Suppose there is only one platform, newspaper A. If newspaper A is a monopoly supplier, the net utility of a reader located at x is
If the monopoly newspaper has a license for the essential complementary good, its number of readers is
If the monopoly newspaper does not have a license for the essential complementary good, the expressions for the number of readers in (9) are scaled down by a factor 1 .
Low price (low t)
In the low-price case, the market is covered. Newspaper A's problem is
. Intuitively (and this can be veri…ed formally), for newspaper A to maximize pro…t in the low-price case, the constraint must be binding for the most distant reader,
It cannot be optimal for newspaper A to leave the most distant consumer with any surplus. Given (10), newspaper A's problem can be reformulated as
The …rst-order condition to solve (11) is
A marginal increase in A reduces the number of advertisements sold, 1
A , but increases pro…t per advertisement, + A c. Part of the change in pro…t per advertisement is the decrease in the price readers pay, (10). Part of the increase in pro…t per advertisement is the increase in pro…t from sales to advertisers, A c.
From (12), the monopoly price per reader of an advertisement is
Because is the equilibrium price per reader per advertisement, the …rstorder condition that determines , and the resulting equilibrium value, is the same, , for all newspapers in all models considered in this paper. This is the "competitive bottleneck" aspect of the basic model: depending on the details (monopoly, duopoly, essential complementary good), a platform's equilibrium number of readers will vary. But it is a monopolist with respect to those readers' access to advertisements, and it charges advertisers the monopoly price. The low-t monopoly outcome is illustrated in Figure 2 .
High price (high t)
In the high-price regime, newspaper A's problem is
The monopoly price per reader of an advertisement is again , and the monopoly price is
A consistency condition for this solution to be valid is p m high t 1 A t. On some rearrangement of terms, the consistency condition for the high- price solution to apply is that transportation cost be su¢ ciently high,
In the contrary case,
it is the low-price solution that maximizes monopoly pro…t.
The threshold value of transportation cost, which should be given its …gurative interpretation as an indicator of the extent of product di¤erentiation, appears repeatedly in what follows, and for notational compactness we de…ne
Monopoly Payo¤s
For low levels of transportation cost, t t H , a monopoly supplier sets price so the market is covered, extracting all surplus from the most distant readers. For higher levels of transportation cost, the market is not covered. Row 1 of Table 1 gives the equilibrium payo¤ of a monopoly newspaper if the newspaper is licensed (all readers are in the market, although not all readers may be served). Row 2 of Table 1 gives the equilibrium payo¤s of an unlicensed monopolist.
In what follows, we assume parameter values such that licensed monopoly is pro…table. From the second row, an unlicensed monopoly is unpro…table for su¢ ciently close to 1.
Newspaper Duopoly
Expression (8) is the generic form of the duopoly maximization problem. The relation between the number of readers and prices di¤ers depending on whether both newspapers are licensed, one newspaper is licensed, or neither newspaper is licensed.
Both newspapers licensed
As noted above (see remarks immediately after (12)), the equilibrium price per reader of an advertisement is = 1 2 [1 ( c)]. If both newspapers are licensed and the market is covered, equilibrium prices to readers are
The market is covered at these prices, as we assume, for t 4 3 t H :
It would be possible to analyze scenarios in which the center of the market is not served in duopoly equilibrium. But such cases would not involve exclusion, and we con…ne our attention to cases in which the market is covered in duopoly. 21 The corresponding payo¤ per newspaper is d LL = 1 2 t F:
We assume F 1 2 t, which ensures that equilibrium duopoly pro…t per newspaper in the low-t case if both newspapers are licensed is nonnegative. 22 Duopoly equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Neither newspaper licensed
If neither newspaper is licensed, demands are scaled down by the factor 1 . The resulting payo¤ per newspaper is
From (7), the reduction in pro…t of an unlicensed newspaper includes lost advertising revenue, a kind of loss unique to a newspaper that supplies a platform market.
(1 
Duopoly: one newspaper licensed, one newspaper unlicensed
Without loss of generality, suppose that newspaper A has a license for the essential complementary good, newspaper B does not.
Low price (low t)
Objective functions are given by (8), and the numbers of readers are n A R = + (1 )
and
Economic pro…t per reader is given by (7). Equilibrium price per reader per advertisement is the bottleneck value for both newspapers, A = B = .
Equilibrium prices are 23
The consistency condition for the low-price solution to be valid is p A n A a t, and this is satis…ed for
High price (high t)
In the high-price regime, newspaper A serves only a portion fraction of readers who regard the complementary good as essential. It divides the other group of consumers with newspaper B. Newspaper B's …rst-order conditions are unchanged from the low-p A regime. Newspaper A's pro…t per reader is also as in the low-p A regime. Newspaper A's number of readers in the high-p A case is
Equilibrium readers'prices are
Consistency
The consistency condition for the equilibrium price given by (26) After some manipulation, this becomes t t H :
The consistency condition for the low-p A regime, (24), is t t L . In combination, we have three ranges relating t to newspaper A's pro…t-maximizing price to readers,
6 Intermediate product di¤erentiation: t L t t H
For an intermediate degree of product di¤erentiation, t L t t H , newspaper A sets p A to extract all surplus from the most distant readers who regard the complementary material as essential. The magnitude of t H t L increases with (see Figure 4 ).
( The essential-complementary good submarket is covered. This case is shown in Figure 5 . The elements of the intermediate-t equilibrium are summarized here:
n A a = n B a = 1 :
In this case, n A R + n B R = 1 and all readers are served. Further, n A R ! 1 and n B R ! 0 as ! 1. Knowing p A , we obtain p B from newspaper B's reader-price …rst-order condition. Newspapers'equilibrium pro…ts are
License o¤er games
For the syndicate, the license o¤er game is an optimal control problem: it decides which of two games the newspapers play. The syndicate may make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a license only to newspaper A (without loss of generality) at a contingent fee (L 1 A ; L 2 A ), where L 1 A is the fee if newspaper B does not enter and L 2 A is the fee if newspaper B does enter. Alternatively, the syndicate may make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to both newspapers at contingent fee (L 1 AB ; L 2 AB ; L 3 AB ), where L 1 AB is the fee paid by one newspaper if the other newspaper does not enter, L 2 AB is the license fee paid by one newspaper if the other newspaper accepts the o¤er and enters, and L 3 AB is the license fee if the other newspaper rejects the o¤er and enters. In all cases, equilibrium license fees leaves each newspaper a small positive payo¤ if the o¤er is accepted. 24 If the syndicate o¤ers a license only to newspaper A, A and B play the game shown in Figure 6 . Newspaper A may either accept the o¤er of an exclusive license and enter the market, reject the o¤er and enter the market, or stay out. The game then moves to one of newspaper B's decision nodes. At each node, B's choices are to enter the market without a license or to stay out of the market.
If the syndicate o¤ers a license to both newspapers, A and B play the game shown in Figure 8 . Newspapers simultaneously decide to accept the o¤er of a license and enter the market, to reject the o¤er and enter the market, or to stay out.
Syndicate o¤ers a license only to newspaper A
It is reasonable to assume that if the Syndicate o¤ers a license to newspaper A, newspaper B would be aware of the o¤er and A's response when it makes its entry decision. Thus the path of decisions ( Figure 6) is sequential. 24 In equilibrium, it is L 1 A that is paid in the …rst game, L 2 AB that is paid in the second game. The other license fees maximize the syndicate's payo¤ o¤ the equilibrium path. If the syndicate speci…es license fee L 1 A for all states of the world in the …rst game, and license fee L 2 AB for all states of the world in the second game, Nash equilibrium outcomes are as indicated in the text. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
For such , if newspaper A accepts an o¤er of an exclusive license, it generates economic pro…t m L = 2t H t F: If the syndicate makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an exclusive license to A, to ensure that A will accept, it will set a license fee that in equilibrium leaves newspaper A a small positive economic pro…t if it accepts the license and newspaper B does not enter:
for " positive and small. If newspaper B enters without a license, newspaper A's payo¤ is (30). The contingent license fee that maximizes the syndicate's payo¤ in this outof-equilibrium state of the world is
If A accepts the o¤er and B stays out, A makes a small positive economic pro…t, B makes zero economic pro…t. If A accepts the o¤er and B enters, B makes losses for su¢ ciently large. If A rejects the o¤er and both newspapers enter in the market, the two newspapers are a duopoly serving a market of 1 readers. Duopoly pro…ts per newspaper, (19), are negative for > 1 2F t U L;U L :
We have assumed > X , and this implies > U L;U L . Hence if A rejects the license o¤er and both newspapers enter, both newspapers make economic losses.
If A rejects the o¤er of an exclusive license and enters, while B stays out, A's economic pro…t as an unlicensed monopolist (see Table 1 ) is negative for
Assume > max ( X ; m U L ) : Under this assumption, if A rejects the o¤er of an exclusive license and enters, while B stays out, then A makes economic losses and B makes zero economic pro…t.
If A stays out, and B enters, A earns zero economic pro…t. B is an unlicensed monopolist. The assumption > max ( X ; m U L ) implies that B makes economic losses.
If the syndicate o¤ers a license only to newspaper A, the newspapers play the game shown in Figure 6 . Figure 7 shows the payo¤ matrix for the resulting …nite game of complete and perfect information. The signs shown in the …gure are valid for > max ( X ; m U L ). (Accept and enter, Stay out) is the unique noncooperative equilibrium of the game. The syndicate's payo¤ is
for " small. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
a newspaper that accepts the o¤er earns payo¤ " > 0 whatever the decision of the other newspaper, makes losses if it rejects and enters, for su¢ ciently large, and breaks even if it stays out. Figure 9 shows the payo¤ matrix for the game played by A and B if the syndicate o¤ers licenses to both newspapers. The signs shown in the …gure are valid for > max ( X ; m U L ). The unique noncooperative equilibrium of the game is (Accept and enter, Accept and enter). The syndicate's payo¤ is Signs given are for su¢ ciently large; see text for discussion.
Syndicate' s payo¤
The di¤erence between the syndicate's payo¤ if it o¤ers an exclusive license and if it o¤ers both newspapers licenses is
This implies
Theorem 1 For intermediate values of t (t L t t H ) and su¢ ciently large, (a) the syndicate's payo¤-maximizing choice is to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an exclusive license to one of the two newspapers, at license fee L A = m L "; (b) the payo¤-maximizing choice of the newspaper that is o¤ered a license is to accept it;
Licensed Monopoly
Licensed Duopoly Duopoly Monopoly Newspaper pro…t (c) the payo¤-maximizing choice of the newspaper that is not o¤ered a license is to stay out of the market.
For su¢ ciently close to 1, the syndicate maximizes its payo¤ by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of an exclusive license to one of the two newspapers, at license fee L A = m L ". For intermediate degrees of product di¤erentiation, an exclusive license for a complementary good that a su¢ cient number of consumers regard as essential can make the unlicensed newspaper unprofitable, although both newspapers would be pro…table if both were licensed. Table 2 compares pro…ts, consumer surplus, and net surplus under licensed monopoly and licensed duopoly for the intermediate-t case. 25 The "newspaper pro…t" given in the …rst row of the table is the total pro…t generated by the operation of active newspapers. 26 Comparing licensed duopoly and licensed monopoly shows that monopoly pro…t is greater than total duopoly pro…t, and duopoly consumer surplus is greater than monopoly consumer surplus. Advertisers'pro…t is the same under both regimes, since the market is covered in both cases. The di¤erence in net surplus under the two regimes is
Welfare
We have assumed that licensed duopoly is pro…table for both newspapers, 1 2 t F 0. Then N S d N S m for F 1 4 t, N S d < N S m for 1 4 t < F 1 2 t. If …xed cost is small relative to reader preferences, duopoly net surplus exceeds monopoly net surplus, and vice versa.
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In Section 6 we considered the case of intermediate product di¤erentiation, t L t t H . Here we indicate brie ‡y results if di¤erentiation is low, t t L , or if di¤erentiation is high, t > t H .
Low product di¤erentiation
If newspapers are close substitutes, an example shows that an exclusive license need not be exclusionary.
The inequality that de…nes the low-t region is (24), Let parameter values be = 0:9001, c = f = 0:00001, F = 0:01, and = 0:8. Then t L = 0:1231. If t = 0:1, B's payo¤ is B; low t L;U L = 0:1244 > 0. For any , if t is su¢ ciently small -if products are close enough to being perfect substitutes, the unlicensed newspaper has positive pro…t.
With low di¤erentiation, B's share of readers falls as rises, but is bounded away from 0. As A's share of readers rises, it increases p A . As one expects for price-setting duopoly, as A sets a higher price, so does B. The net e¤ect of falling n B R and rising p B as rises is that B's pro…t B L;U L rises as rises.
High product di¤erentiation
For t H t 4 3 t H ;
newspaper A sets a high-enough price that some of the essential-complementary good submarket is uncovered, while the segment of the market that is indifferent toward the complementary good is covered (see (18)). From Table 1 , licensed monopoly economic pro…t is
and if the syndicate o¤ers an exclusive license, it will set license fee
for the equilibrium case that A accepts the o¤er of an exclusive license and B stays out. If the monopolist is unlicensed, its payo¤ m;U L high t = (1 ) 
Duopoly payo¤s if both newspapers are licensed or if neither newspaper is licensed are unchanged from the previous cases. If the syndicate o¤ers licenses to both newspapers, it will set contingent license fees to extract all but a small amount of surplus at alternative terminal nodes of the game tree; this is L high t AB = 1 2 t F "
for the case that both newspapers accept the o¤er. This leads to a game with noncooperative equilibrium (Accept and enter, Accept and enter), for su¢ ciently large. If the syndicate o¤ers A an exclusive license at appropriately structured contingent license fees, the newspapers play a game with equilibrium (Accept and enter, Stay out), for su¢ ciently large. In this sense, an exclusive license can be exclusionary.
The di¤erence between the syndicate's equilibrium payo¤ in the two cases is
and this is of ambiguous sign. In the high-t licensed monopoly regime, the market is uncovered. With licensed duopoly, the market is covered. For small F and t t H su¢ ciently large, the syndicate's payo¤ harvesting duopoly pro…t in a covered market can exceed its payo¤ from an uncovered monopoly market. An exclusive license can make the unlicensed newspaper unpro…table. But if product di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently great, a large-enough number of readers would then be unserved that the syndicate's most pro…table option is to o¤er licenses to both newspapers.
Conclusion
The literature on one-sided markets (for example, Whinston (1990) ) suggests that tying, bundling, and exclusive dealing contracts may, but need not, have exclusionary e¤ect. Our results extend this …nding to exclusive licenses in two-sided markets. In such markets, the exclusionary impact of a loss of patronage from one side of the market (readers) is magni…ed by the resulting loss in revenue (advertising) from the other side of the market, for intermediate degrees of product di¤erentiation.
Many regional markets -regional in physical space, regional in productcharacteristic space -will support at most a small number of …rms. In such markets, an exclusive contract for a complementary product can make unlicensed …rms unpro…table. Such exclusion makes consumers worse o¤, and if consumer preferences are su¢ ciently strong, reduces net surplus.
Our results hold for the case of a monopoly upstream supplier of an essential complementary good. A logical extension of this framework, and a subject for possible future research, is to an upstream duopoly of vertically-di¤erentiated components. It is natural to expect that exclusive licenses will be exclusionary if upstream components di¤er sharply in quality, otherwise not. One might also view press syndicates as platforms that allow advice columnists, astrologers, and comic strip artists to interact with newspapers. Also a subject for future research, this would lead to a model of an upstream platform market supplying a downstream platform market.
